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The labour of Nature is paid, not because she does much but because she does little.
In proportion, as she becomes niggardly in her gifts, she exacts a greater price for
her work. Where she is magnificently beneficent, she always works gratis. (Ricardo,
1817)
Paying for the provision of environmental services is a recent policy
innovation attracting much attention in both developed and developing
countries. This innovation, referred to as ‘payments for ecosystem services’
(when the emphasis is on enhancing ‘nature’ services) or ‘payments
for environmental services’ (when amenities provided by the built
environment are also included) is referred to here as PES. PES programs aim
to harness market forces to obtain more efficient environmental outcomes.
Since so many opportunities for PES programs could involve farmers in
poor regions, international aid agencies and private donors, looking for a
double dividend, increasingly consider using PES programs as a potential
way of meeting both social and environmental objectives.
This special issue presents articles that provide conceptual,
methodological, and empirical perspectives on the performance and
potential of PES both as a mechanism for environmental protection and for
poverty reduction. The effectiveness of PES meeting these twin objectives
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depends both on context specific circumstances and program design. The
studies presented here offer insights into the design of PES programs, their
direct and indirect impacts, and the constraints affecting their performance.
This introductory paper provides a short overview of PES programs,
within the context of the economics of environmental regulation. It also
provides a guide to the studies presented in this special issue. We start
with methodological and empirical studies that attempt to identify the
program design and overall conditions when PES programs can benefit
the poor. Next, we address studies that deal with issues of targeting, and,
finally, we consider special case studies that illustrate the diversity of PES
programs and the wide range of situations where they have been and are
being introduced.
PES as economic policy tools
Economists realize that generating positive environmental externalities,
as well managing public environmental goods, generally necessitates
public policy interventions of various forms. Until now, governments’
attempts to correct environmental externality problems have primarily
been through the use of command-and-control and other forms of direct
intervention, which are fairly easy to implement, but can be quite
inefficient. Coase (1960) argued that effective legal structures with well-
defined and enforceable policy rights can lead to systems of voluntary
contracts, overcoming many problems of market failure associated with
environmental externalities. Coase’s arguments hold in cases where
transaction costs are low and information is available cheaply. Baumol
and Oates (1989) present an overview of various more efficient market-
based approaches to achieve environmental objectives. Pollution taxes
and fees have been recommended frequently as remedies to pollution
problems. Carbon taxes are favored by many economists as the preferred
tool for addressing climate change problems. However, the ‘polluter pays’
principle is often difficult to introduce and implement for political and
legal reasons. A more recent market-based alternative is the ‘cap and
trade’ approach, where policymakers establish an aggregate target level
of, say, pollution emissions, allocate emission rights among firms, and
allow trade in these rights to meet the emission targets at least cost. Many
polluting industries prefer ‘cap and trade’ to pollution taxation because,
with trading, income is redistributed within the industry, while taxation
transfers resources to the government. PES can be a complement to market-
based environmental regulatory mechanisms; under cap and trade regimes,
such as carbon emissions offset trading schemes, payments for emission
reductions are a large and growing category of PES. Other types of PES
programs, particularly large government funded programs such as the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the US, are managed to encourage
socially optimal levels of positive environmental amenities.
It is useful to divide PES programs into three categories according to
their function. Some PES programs pay mostly for pollution control. These
include payments to eliminate or reduce animal waste, or agricultural
chemical residues that reach water reservoirs. For example, Vittel, the
bottled water company, entered into agreements with farmers to change
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land management practices to reduce nitrates in the source water (Perrot-
Maıˆtre, 2006). PES may also be payments for the conservation of natural
resources and ecosystems including forest resources and wetlands, wild flora
and fauna species, and agricultural crop and livestock species. Finally,
some PES are used to generate environmental amenities that are public goods.
Examples include planting trees to sequester carbon to reduce greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere (a global public good), and/or to regulate water
flows and soil erosion to improve watershed function (a local or regional
public good).
Another useful distinction is between land diversion and working-land
PES programs. An example of a land diversion program discussed in this
issue, comes from Kenya, where a PES program is proposed to pay farmers
to divert some of their cropland near Amboseli National Park to allow
elephants access to food sources and migration routes. An example of a
working-land program is the Silvopastoral Project described by Pagiola
and colleagues in this issue.
Gainers and losers from PES programs
Some of the reasons for strong interest in using PES programs for poverty
reduction include the high incidence of poverty in rural areas, as well
as the reliance of poor rural households on natural resources, often of
low quality, for their livelihoods. The rural poor may be located on steep
slopes in upper reaches of watershed or on the margins of biodiversity
rich forests (Heath and Binswanger, 1996; Chomitz et al., 2007; FAO, 2007).
Poverty can drive people to deplete natural resources, generating negative
environmental externalities as well as long-term losses to the producers
themselves (Vosti and Reardon, 1997). Paying the poor to improve their
environmental management could generate benefits to these households,
and to others in the form of local and global environmental goods and
services (FAO, 2007). Examples of these types of PES schemes are discussed
in the Antle and Stoorvogel, Graff-Zivin and Lipper, and Pagiola et al.
papers in this issue.
Managing PES for poverty reduction raises two basic questions: (i) do
payments make poor households better off, and (ii) to what extent is
PES compatible with an economically viable development trajectory for
economies as a whole? To date, most of the debate focuses on the first
question. Probably this is because PES efforts are currently too small to
have any significant impact at the aggregate level. This could change, as
suggested by the rapid and widespread impacts of biofuel development
on food prices, and thus food security and the poor. Implemented on a
significant scale, PES programs have the potential to impact the price of
food, labor, and land, any of which could have considerable impacts on the
poor (Zilberman et al., this issue).
Two papers in this issue provide a general examination of the effect of PES
on environmental quality and poverty. Zilberman et al. have taken a welfare
economic approach to address this issue, while Wunder uses economic logic
and preliminary evidence to develop several key hypotheses and initial
results. The two papers reach similar conclusions and are complementary
in their approaches and in their findings. Two major points that affect the
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results in both papers are the emphasis on heterogeneity and diversity on
the one hand, and the distinction between disparate program effects on
participants and non-participants on the other.
The Zilberman et al. paper considers the impacts of land diversion and
working-land programs, where the sellers of environmental services are
diverse in terms of farm size, environmental quality, and wealth. They
show that land diversion programs are only likely to benefit the poor
when they are owners of lands poor for agricultural production but
high in environmental service potential, or if the environmental services
generated are important for the poor (e.g. water quality). Otherwise, the
urban poor, landless and smaller landowners are likely to lose, while larger
landowners are likely to gain under such programs, particularly in areas
with large population of landless and urban poor, poorly linked to the
external economy through impacts on food prices and wages. Increased
integration of a rural market with the global economy, providing alternative
sources of food and income, will reduce the negative effects of PES
programs.
Compared with land-diversion PES, working lands PES are more likely
to increase labor demand. In these cases, the urban poor may gain from
PES programs that increase productivity and agricultural output (through
effects on food prices), but lose if a decline occurs, and the landless are
likely to gain from labor market effects. Landowners who participate in
PES programs benefit from the payments, but non-participants may lose
from higher labor costs and lower output prices.
The conceptual analysis by Wunder expands the range of issues that
determine the impact of PES on the poor. First, Wunder emphasizes the
existence of constraints limiting the ability of the poor to participate as
sellers of environmental services. Among the constraints are informal and
insecure land tenure and high transaction costs facing buyers working with
numerous smallholders. These constraints may be reduced by modifying
inappropriate access restrictions, by developing smallholder bundling
schemes and by reducing transaction costs. To the extent that participation
of poor providers is a major concern, Wunder suggests explicit poverty
targeting (farm size limits, etc.) and subsidies.
Wunder also argues that even when the poor sell environmental services,
they are not always likely to be better off. Frequently, they are forced to
participate in programs and a key ingredient for assuring gains is free
choice. Large, singular cash payments may have local detrimental effects,
while well-designed conditional and continuous cash transfers can promote
growth and welfare gains, a conclusion supported by the analysis in the
Antle and Stoorvogel, Graff-Zivin and Lipper, and Pagiola et al. papers
in this issue. Sellers of environmental services, especially in working land
programs, can benefit from asset transfers such as tree transplants, as well
as non-income gains from training, etc. However, Wunder suggests that
because of market power, buyers may be in a better position to extract most
of the rent gains from PES and collective action by or on behalf of poor
sellers may enhance their benefits.
Wunder emphasizes that environmental services can have significant
local benefits for the poor. Some of these benefits are intended, but
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others may just be incidental to other environmental goals. For example,
payments to improve water quality for fisheries may also benefit local water
consumers. He suggests that, in some cases, the poor can be organized and
contribute to the coalition that buys environmental services, and, more
importantly, donor and NGO efforts should be coordinated in the program
design to enhance benefits for the environment and the poor.
Like Zilberman et al., Wunder emphasizes some of the negative impacts
of PES on non-participants, such as the landless, especially when open
access to natural resources is limited. He suggests that the debate on
PES and poverty suffers frequently from lack of perspective: PES are not
likely to change dramatically the poverty picture, either by increasing
substantially resources availability to the poor or by restricting their
opportunities. Setting restrictions on PES to meet poverty criteria may be
counterproductive and a pragmatic approach would view them mostly as
tools to achieve environmental objectives. Wunder’s conclusions imply the
value of analysis in improving PES design and achieving a more realistic
perspective on PES program outcomes through case studies.
The analyses presented in both the Wunder and Zilberman et al. papers
suggest that PES programs cannot always serve to both eliminate poverty
and improve environmental quality. Achieving two objectives for the price
of one policy is tricky and depends on the specific conditions. Concern
about the well-being of the poor implies many PES programs should be
accompanied by safety-net activities to compensate for any losses to the
poor.
The papers by Antle and Stoorvogel, Graff-Zivin and Lipper and Pagiola
et al. in this issue illuminate various aspects of the concerns raised in the
Wunder and Zilberman et al. papers. Pagiola et al. present an empirical
study analyzing the participation of the poor in a PES project implemented
in Nicaragua aimed at enhancing the adoption of certain silvopastoral
practices on degraded pastures. Key concerns about the participation of
the poor include access to credit and technological assistance. They find
that despite significant participation requirements, the poor and extreme
poor can (and, indeed, did) participate in the PES scheme. Participation
may be facilitated by the project’s flexibility, which allows farmers to
choose the package that suits them best. The paper argues that transaction
costs may be a greater threat to participation of the poor than household
characteristics (including their ability to finance certain management
activities). Economies of scale in purchasing ecological services provides
a strong incentive for the buyer to search for large landowners. Unless
mechanisms can be designed to reduce transaction costs, the poor may be
shut out.
Antle and Stoorvogel focus on cases where PES generate both private
and public benefits; using the example of payments to promote the
sequestration of soil carbon in farming systems in Machakos (Kenya),
Cajamarca (Peru), and Southern Peanut Basin (Senegal). Increasing the
carbon content of soils could contribute towards rural poverty alleviation
by increasing agricultural productivity, and reduce food insecurity in
marginal agricultural areas. They present the results of a series of simulation
analyses that indicate that carbon contracts would substantially increase
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adoption of carbon-sequestering technologies. In addition to the provision
of global public goods, the adoption of these technologies leads to enhanced
sustainability of farming systems and higher incomes. However the impact
on poverty alleviation per se appears modest.
Graff-Zivin and Lipper investigate the impacts of risk considerations
on the adoption of conservation agriculture, a technology that generates
soil carbon sequestration. This technology tends to increase production
risks in the short run during a transition phase, but with the potential of
reducing risk and increasing productivity in the long term. They model
the technology within a dynamic optimization framework, assuming that
farmers are risk averse and earn profits from production and payment
for soil carbon sequestration. The paper divides the effects of adoption
on agricultural profits into two main categories: the ‘technology’ effects
of adopting a new production system and the ‘productivity’ effects of
changes in soil carbon on agricultural productivity. Results of the model
suggest that payments for soil carbon sequestration are not likely to be
sufficient to induce changes in farmers’ practices in developing countries,
unless they also involve significant agricultural co-benefits. However, even
for those that do generate higher long-term gains, risk is a major barrier,
particularly for the poor, in adopting these technologies. In this setting,
payments for soil carbon sequestration services can be an effective means
of overcoming the constraint, but only if designed appropriately. Graff-
Zivin and Lipper suggest that pooling soil carbon sequestration payments
and using them to support group insurance schemes could be an effective
way to promote increases in both public and private benefits through soil
carbon sequestration.
Targeting PES
Effective management of PES programs requires detailed data on the
distributions of various indicators of environmental quality across space,
as well as potential profitability from alternative activities, primarily
agriculture. Obtaining such information has become feasible with the
improvement of remote sensing technologies, emergence of geographic
information systems, and improved monitoring and communication
technologies. Initially, most payment programs for land diversion had a
fixed payment per land unit, attracting the least profitable lands while
maximizing the area enrolled. This approach maximizes the environmental
quality obtained given the program budget when there is a negative
correlation between environmental amenities provided and profitability
in alternative use. However, when more profitable lands also provide more
environmental amenities per hectare, the targeting of cheaper lands by the
program may misfire.
An alternative approach is targeting the lands with the highest
environmental benefits. This approach maximizes benefits obtained given
the overall budget if, for example, all lands have the same production value,
but vary in their environmental amenities. However, when economic values
generated per hectare vary, targeting the lands with the best environmental
benefits may be less effective if those lands also provide the most economic
value in production. The environmental benefits given the program budget
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are maximized if lands are selected to the program using an environmental
benefits per dollar paid criteria. Namely, only lands in which environmental
benefits per acre exceed a given threshold are targeted for the program.
Early studies on targeting address the performance of the CRP in the United
States, and have shown that these targeting techniques may expand total
benefits obtained with a given budget by 30 per cent and more (Babcock
et al., 1996). This led to purchasing decisions guided mostly by a benefits-
per-hectare criteria. Participation in the CRP is now based on proposals
where each landowner provides information on several indicators of
environmental quality provided by the land and information on economic
performance and the requested pay.
The paper by Alix-Garcia et al. suggests that both the literature and
program design ignore the fact that environmental preservation is done
under risky conditions. In some locations, the risk of soil erosion and
deforestation is much higher than in others. The paper demonstrates that
PES programs aimed at reducing deforestation in Mexico can improve by
targeting schemes that consider heterogeneity of environmental quality
of preserved forest and risk of deforestation among so-called ejidos,
communities who share land. The analysis considers the benefits of cloud
forests, which provide hydrological benefits, to be higher than that of other
forests and quantifies the benefits accordingly. It also assumes that ejidos
will modify their behavior if payments are at least as high as potential
earnings from deforestation.
Alix-Garcia et al. compare three program designs. The first is similar to
the current PES program with a flat payment per hectare, and an upper
bound on total payment per ejido. The second payment scheme adjusts
payment per hectare according to risk of deforestation, thus targeting
high deforestation risk forests. The third program distributes payments to
maximize environmental benefits given a budget constraint. This program
targets ejidos where forest preservation provides the highest expected
benefits per dollar spent, taking into account both the risk of deforestation
and the quality of environmental benefits provided. Their analysis shows
that the flat payment scheme with a cap on eligible land size is the
most equitable but least efficient in terms of environmental benefit per
dollar spent. The benefits maximizing program will produce four times
the environmental benefits of the flat payment program, but analysis of
the distributional implications show that with the benefits maximizing
program, benefit per member to poor and indigenous are much lower
than to their counter parts, because the poor provide lower quality forest
protection. A flat payment scheme distributes the payment more or less
equally across size and poverty classes.
The analysis of Alix-Garcia et al. expands the findings of previous
studies to show that alternative targeting schemes offer policy makers,
and purchasers of environmental services, tradeoffs. When the purchaser
of environmental services is an environmental group, they are more likely
to pursue an environmental benefits maximizing strategy, but when the
payer is a government, political economic forces may lead to strategies that
provide more poverty reduction and less environmental benefit given the
budget.
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Payments for wildlife conservation
Much of the PES literature emphasizes payments for water quality
protection and for carbon sequestration in the context of crop or forest
systems. However, growing concerns about the environmental risks of
avian flu, invasive species, and endangered species in livestock and wildlife
systems have led to consideration of PES as a solution here as well. Two of
the papers in this special issue address PES in the context of wildlife; one
by Bulte et al. and the other by Horan et al.
Bulte et al. conduct a simple cost–benefit analysis to consider the
economic rationale of paying Maasai near Amboseli National Park, Kenya,
to improve wildlife habitat. Traditional grazing grounds, shared by wildlife
and livestock, are increasingly converted into agricultural fields. As these
fields are fenced in to protect the crops from predation, migratory routes
for species like elephants are blocked. An integrated and spatially explicit
ecosystem-household model is developed to explore the ecological response
to changes in economic incentives, and in particular to analyze the
conservation effects of introducing a PES scheme that restores pastoralism
as a competitive activity. The main result is that the conservation effects
of a PES scheme are likely sufficiently large to warrant implementation.
However, an important caveat is in order: feedback or leakage effects
may undermine the long-run success of a PES scheme. If households
use conservation payments to expand their livestock herd – buy more
goats and cattle – the outcome would be enhanced competition for
forage, with possible detrimental effects for the abundance of wildlife
species.
Horan et al. consider PES to address two problems that cause extinction
of endangered species. One is habitat loss and fragmentation, and the
other is the spread of disease. Some diseases may be carried by domestic
animals. For example, Horan et al. model the case of the Andean deer
which is vulnerable to cross-species transmission of disease from livestock.
Developing an optimal strategy that maximizes discounted benefits
from the two species, minus costs, and leads to sustainable outcomes
requires understanding the population dynamics of the two species and
several actions. Their model includes expansion of land available for the
endangered species and vaccination of the domesticated species. These
actions can be triggered by PES and the optimal solution suggests that
initially the payment will be to landowners to allow movement of,
and increase habitat for, the endangered species. Later on, payment for
vaccinations will go to owners of livestock.
The Horan et al. model demonstrates the complexity of designing
PES programs to recover endangered species populations, especially
when the ecological problem may involve interdependency between
species and complementary action is required. The PES schemes are
complex because they require payments to different economic agents,
where timing and amount of payment are dependent on monitoring
wildlife and domestic livestock populations. Horan et al. also note that
implementing these programs means addressing potential corruption
problems, as well as strategic behavior by the owners of domesticated
animals.
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Conclusions
The evidence on PES and poverty reduction presented in this issue gives
some reason for optimism; we can identify locations and situations where
the poor are likely to benefit, we have considerable insights on the types
of program designs needed to facilitate their capacity to benefit, and we
have empirical evidence indicating that the poor do indeed participate in,
and benefit from, PES programs. These findings support the analysis of
Pagiola et al. (2005) who suggested that the pre-condition for PES programs
to have beneficial effects on poverty reduction is that the poor should: (i) be
in the ‘right place’; (ii) want to participate (e.g., it should ‘fit’ into the farm
practice); and (iii) be able to participate (e.g., they should be able to make the
necessary investments, have sufficiently secure tenure, etc.). It is quite easy
to design programs that fail to meet one or more of these conditions, and
such programs are unlikely to help in fighting poverty. If resource users
go uncompensated, say because they lack formal property rights to the
resource they use, diverting resources to the provision of ecosystem services
may result in high opportunity cost in the form of foregone development,
exacerbating poverty.
However, the analyses presented here also indicate that tying PES
and poverty reduction may result in lower efficiency in meeting either
objective – and in fact it may be better to focus programs on one or the other
objective separately. Nonetheless, since PES programs can have indirect
effects on the poor-through changes in food prices, wages and land access –
poverty and the poor do need to be taken into consideration in designing
PES programs, even if poverty reduction is not an objective of the program.
If PES reaches the poor, we may infer that it will make them better
off and in fact evidence presented by Pagiola (this issue) indicates this
is the case. Zilberman et al. (this issue) find that the poor are most
likely to benefit from participation in PES programs when the returns to
ecosystem services and agriculture are negatively correlated over space.
Flexible payment schedules and the importance of effective collective action
amongst suppliers are also identified as key to success. The potential of
PES to provide a relatively stable flow of income, and therefore reduce
income fluctuations amongst participants, can be valuable for people close
to the margin. There may also be positive non-income effects, ranging from
improvements in the supply of ecosystem services, which are critical to the
poor, as well as the potential impact of PES agreements on the formation of
social capital.
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